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Abstract 
This research is an investigation on the deal-specific factors impacting long-term 
performance of cross-border M&A and on the nature of such relations. The analysis is 
conducted on a sample of 187 cross-border deals completed within the pharmaceutical and 
biotech industries by Western European bidders between 2000 and 2009. Findings suggest 
that post-deal variation in gross profit improves when bidders diversify in other businesses, 
when assets are purchased instead of equity, and when stock is used as deal currency. 
Furthermore, the method of payment is found to moderate the effects geographical distance 
has on deal outcomes.  
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The global pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries are among those that have 
experienced the most dynamic competition and industrial restructuring in the past decade, a 
phenomenon that is not expected to change in the near future
1
. In such anticipated intense 
competitive developments cross-border M&A will perform a central role for companies’ 
growth and survival, which makes it a compelling issue within the Corporate Strategies 
field. 
Price reductions brought about by diminished healthcare budgets, limited product pipelines 
and decreased R&D productivity, together with smaller patent duration and surfacing of 
emerging markets are some of the challenges that will remain relevant in the near future
2
. 
Adding up the new opportunities opened up by highly profitable and hardly imitable 
biologic drugs
3
, a considerably dynamic future ecosystem results.  
Whether a vehicle for critical resources and capabilities acquisition or a mean to perform 
successful exit strategies, M&A will be one of the means to address strategic needs and, 
according to executives in the field
4
, a new wave is not unlikely to be expected
5
. 
Although the core of global Pharmaceutical industry has traditionally been concentrated in 
Western Europe
67
, the rise of emerging markets together with a more favorable US 
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 might justify domestic investment replacement with cross-
border activity
9
. This motivates the choice of studying the performance of Western 
European acquirers following their cross-border M&A deals.   
The present work is an investigation on the factors related to better M&A performance and 
on the nature of such relations. The aim is to fill the gap left unexplored in extant studies on 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, answering the following research 
questions: 
Which are the deal-specific factors impacting long-term M&A performance in cross-border 
deals and how do they impact cross-border M&A long-term outcomes? 
Dealing with the topic from a managerial perspective, this research will contribute to 
provide insights about past cross-border M&A activity as well as a partial framework for 
future practices.  
2. Literature review  
In order to gather a thorough understanding of the factors driving M&A performance, state-
of-the art research was thoroughly investigated and findings were then aggregated in the 
taxonomy below.  
Acquiring-firm specific factors. Innovation intensity10 is a first significant determinant of 
CAR
11
. This is consistent with the essentiality of internally generated knowledge assets, 
provided that external knowledge alone would not be sufficient in sustaining international 
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. Indeed, in the pharmaceutical industry previous access to target R&D 
activities information and higher negotiating power are positively correlated with acquirer’s 
performance in case of outsourced R&D
 13
. Assimilating new external knowledge is in fact 
associated with the number of produced patents
14




Furthermore, acquirer's HR policies and reward systems quality leads to lower hostility 
among target’s employees
16
, which in turn might be related to better results, given the 
positive effects of employees’ retention
17
.  
Domestic and cross-border experience, acquirers’ age and size are common controls in the 
vast majority of state-of-the-art studies
18
. 
Target-firm specific factors. Subsidiary's capability of generating knowledge, sourcing it and 
integrating from multiple sources is positively linked to subsidiary's innovation
19
. In turn, 
multinationals performance is associated with subsidiaries knowledge outflows, driven by 
knowledge explicitness and frequency of communication with headquarters
20
. Knowledge 
complementarity between the parties has a positive impact on learning within the merged 
entity
21
. Indeed, local complementary assets are essential in order to obtain sustained cross-
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. Deals return more to acquirer’s shareholders when both parties own 
strategically valuable resources and capabilities
23
. 
Prior collaboration with acquirer fosters employees’ trust within target firms
24
, which 
suggests a smoother integration process. Also, targets located in developed countries 
experience higher CAR
25
. Target size, relative profitability, relatedness, private versus 
public nature are common controls.  
Deal-specific factors. Earn out agreements foster higher performance
26
. Stock-financed deals 
are positively associated with CAR, although evidence might not hold with longer-term 
performance
27
. Friendly takeovers and low removal of target autonomy have a positive 
impact on employees’ trust, which in turn drives better M&A outcomes
28
.  
In high-technology firms, whether or not integrating the target is a strategic decision based 
on industry specifics and on cultural and institutional distance and impacts value creation.
29
  




Process-specific factors. Strategic and organizational fit31 are core determinants of 
performance
32
and a thorough due diligence tackling employees and business capabilities is 
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associated with better outcomes, while investment, financing, tax, legal and IT issues 
examination are not significant
33
. Knowledge transfer and employees retention have a 
positive impact on performance, yet mitigated by organizational cultural distance
34
. 
Managerial support and communication with employees impacts resistance behaviors, 
which can undermine M&A success given the vital importance of involving key operating 
managers and staff in the process
35
. Assimilation and internalization of tacit knowledge
36
 
positively impacts cross-border acquisition performance and allows application in future 
operations
37
. A comprehensive list of process-related problems is provided in (Very & 
Schweiger 2001) and (Jemison & Sitkin 1986). 
Environmental factors. Cultural and institutional distance do impact cross-border outcomes, 
but with little agreement on research findings
38
. High-tech firms experience higher realized 
performance when their target is located in countries experiencing weak property rights 
protection
39
. Industry-specific sales growth do affect M&A performance of horizontal 
deals, as well as industry sales concentration, which affects CAR negatively. Foreign 
competition within the industry, industry technological intensity and degree of deregulation 
affect M&A outcomes
40
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Conclusion. Provided the complex nature of the topic at hand, the extant literature is 
accordingly wide in scope. At target, acquirer and process level endogenous factors revolve 
around either knowledge management, HR aspects and/or access to strategic resources. 
Instead, environmental studies account for exogenous factors, while research on deal 
structures is rather related to management decision-making on payment methods, 
percentage sought and the like. In order to tackle the research question from a managerial 
perspective, this study focuses on deal-specific factors and particularly on those believed to 
directly affect long-term performance.  
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. Dependent variable 
State-of-the-art research provides a variety of performance definitions and metrics, whose 
choice depends on research aims and scope. In this research performance is defined as 
acquiring companies’ long-term
42
 operating results measured as Gross profit percent 
change over the 3 years following deal completion. Data was sourced from acquirers’ 
financial statements and then aggregated in order to obtain the metric below.  
                       
                                          
                    
43 
Using this metric allows to consider both growth in sales revenues and costs rationalization, 
which provides a more thorough approach to acquirer’s growth than considering sales 
growth alone. Cost of goods sold is actually one of the most relevant costs components 
within pharmaceutical companies, doubling R&D expenses and representing around 30% 
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 Although it is actually hard to draw a clear boundary between short and long term, 3 to 5 years are 
generally considered a reasonable horizon by extant research. 
43
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of sales in brand name companies
44
and an even higher percentage in generics 
manufacturers. This suggests that controlling raw materials expenditures as well as 
inventory management is an essential determinant of competitiveness. Although assessing 
margins improvement is a reasonable approach to performance measurement, limitations of 
this metric are discussed in section 7. 
3.2. Independent variables 
Diversification. Acquiring companies can decide whether to expand into the same business 
through horizontal M&A or to diversify into new activities and create a conglomerate.  In 
turn, diversification can either involve the same stage of the value chain or qualify as 
vertical integration
45
. Horizontal M&A are generally associated with increased market 
share and economies of scale, while diversification can lead to more efficient access to 
input resources or distribution channels in case of vertical integration, or on stability of 
revenue streams contrasting industry maturity. 
H1 below is built on previous findings on the pharmaceutical industry and assuming that 
direct correlation exists between the number of innovations developed and sales growth, 
which is in accordance with extant research findings
46
. Evidence supports that scale 
obtained through horizontal M&A and increased R&D spending in the same innovation 
domain are not necessary nor sufficient conditions for enhanced R&D productivity and that 
in fact many new compounds are rather developed by small firms
47
. R&D development 
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 is instead reported to be related to economies of scope
49
, being efficient and 
effective for a company to apply knowledge in one area to other domains. According to 
historical evidence, diversification especially in high growth sectors is crucial within the 
pharmaceutical industry in order to overcome periods of stalling revenues and sustain the 
existing volume of R&D expenses
50
.  
Vertical integration has a determinant role in creating an innovation base and contributing 
to build a sustained competitive advantage for firms. In fact, it leads to innovations having 
a disruptive potential and a wider breadth among different fields due to access to valuable 
and complementary knowledge sourced along the value chain
 51
.  
Drawing on arguments above on the beneficial outcomes of diversification and vertical 
integration, H1 is formulated, according to which revenue stability, higher invention 
importance and wider invention domain would drive positive M&A outcomes.    
H1:  Diversification has a positive impact on performance 
Geographical proximity. Geographical distance is claimed not to be beneficial to M&A 
outcomes, since it generally entails information asymmetries hindering ex-ante valuation of 
business opportunities and ex-post monitoring of target activity
52
. Other issues include 
reduced knowledge of non-domestic markets
53
, difficult technology transfer and internal 
resources deployment
54
, liability of foreignness, double-layered acculturation and winner’s 
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. Instead, geographical proximity allows easier access to valuable information and is 
generally associated with value-enhancing governance activities at targets – e.g. poor 
management replacement and acquirer’s representation into the target’s board
56
leading to 
positive long-term operating performance
57
. Furthermore, geographical proximity fosters 
operating and knowledge synergies
58
. In formulating H2 it is also assumed that Western 
European acquirers are more knowledgeable about Western European markets than they are 
about further areas of the world.  
H2:  Geographical proximity has a positive impact on performance 
Asset deals. Strategic resources can be acquired either purchasing equity or assets of the 
target firm. Asset purchases allow to select the purchased resources and leave behind items 
which are not value-adding – e.g., target’s liabilities. However, control might be an issue – 
e.g., as the asset is embedded in the target firm problems might arise due to target’s de facto 
control. Evidence supports that asset purchases are associated with greater acquirer’s gains 
compared to stock deals
59
. Allowing direct IP transfer while avoiding the complex 
integration process, asset purchase is a mean for pharmaceutical and biotech firms to save 
costs and avoid risk related to testing and bringing to the market a brand new product over 
the long time-horizon which is typical within the industries at hand. This would provide 
revenues stability and shorter time-to-market.   
                                                          
55
Liability of foreignness: costs of operating beyond national boundaries  
Double-layered acculturation: the necessity for the company expanding its operations abroad to become 
acquainted with national environment of the host country as well as with the organization of the acquire 
company (Dikova et al, 2013) 
Winner’s curse: in the context of a M&A auction foreign bidders incur information disadvantages compared 
to local players, thus overpaying in case of success (Uysal et al., 2006)  
56
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H3: Asset purchase drives higher M&A performance 
Method of payment. The currency used to settle the deal – i.e., whether to pay providing 
acquirer’s stock or cash to target firm – is one of the most relevant aspects of M&A 
operations. Due to the considerable uncertainty surrounding cross-border deals than 
domestic investment, the importance of payment method gets even more compelling within 
the present framework. Whereas cash-financed M&A generally entail local management 
replacement, a first relevant advantage of stock payments consists in keeping core human 
resources within the target firm
60
. This leads to a less disruptive integration process in 
which local expertise is retained. Indeed, long-term indirect effects arising from turnover 
might turn to be detrimental to acquirer’s value and undermine M&A success in the worst 
case
61
. Employees and particularly senior management retention is actually a direct 
determinant of knowledge transfer
62
. Empirical evidence actually suggests that tacit 
knowledge
63
transfer is an essential determinant of cross-border deals’ outcomes
64
 and a 
source of competitive advantage due to difficult imitation
65
.  
H4: Stock-financed deals positively impact performance 
As already mentioned above, information asymmetries are generally a matter of distance. 
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Through stock-financing target’s shareholders share post-deal risks with the acquirer and a 
“lock-in” effect is created similar to that claimed within the hostage theory
66
, which 
mitigates information asymmetries.  
H5: Stock-financed deals positively moderate the relation between geographic proximity and 
performance 
3.3. Control variables 
Acquirer and deal size. Acquirer and deal size are common controls in state-of-the-art 
research.  Since they might have some unforeseen influence over M&A performance, they 
have been included in order to avoid biased conclusions.  
Speed of completion. The time elapsed between deal announcement and completion is also 
being considered as control. Indeed, this variable might be considered a proxy of 
negotiation power and/or influence performance outcomes. Its inclusion is thus believed to 
add precision to the model
67
. 
4. Data and methodology 
Sample. A list of cross-border M&A deals completed by Western European pharmaceutical 
and biotech
68
companies between 2000 and 2009 was collected on Bloomberg. Results were 
then filtered in order to obtain only completed deals made by public bidders seeking 50% 
or more of target firm. Considering only public bidders was aimed at avoiding disclosed 
data unavailability due to the private nature of companies. The ownership threshold was set 
assuming that higher ownership means higher impact on acquirer’s performance due to 
                                                          
66
 Theory claiming that targets screening and monitoring is facilitated when target firms share risks with 
acquiring company  (Chen & Hennart 2004) 
67
 (Hunter & Jagtiani 2003), (Grinstein & Hribar 2004) 
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 The pharmaceutical industry considered in the current work includes: medical generic drugs 
manufacturing, drug delivery systems, medical wholesale drug distribution, pharmacy services, therapeutics, 
veterinary diagnostics and products, vitamins and nutrition products, wound/burn skincare products. 
Biotechnology industry includes medical-biomedical and gene manipulation activities.  
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stronger control. After filtering by these criteria and accounting for data unavailability, the 
initial sample decreased to 187 observations.  
As showed in table 1, observations are considerably variable in acquirers’ and deal size
69
. 
Values range from 4M€ to 86B€
70
 with only one fifth of sample being above average and 
from 200k€ to nearly 13B€ with 32 deals raising the average deal value respectively. The 
number of horizontal deals is approximately equal to that of diversification operations, with 
diversifying companies evenly broken into vertical integration and related or unrelated 
diversification. The vast majority of deals are cash-financed equity deals. Asset purchases 
mainly involve IP acquisition – i.e., manufacturing or marketing rights on products. Cross-
border activity occurs within and outside Western Europe almost evenly. Acquirers’ long-
term performance
71
 is positive on average, with one in five companies performing above 
average.  
Methodology. In this cross-sectional correlational study data on the independent variables 
were sourced from Bloomberg, while the dependent variable was built from data gathered 
from acquirers’ financial statements. An overview of variables with definition, 
measurement, labels and source is reported in table 2. In order to test the hypotheses above 
and answer the research question data were collected for each deal, aggregated into a 
dataset and then analyzed within a multiple linear regression model. 
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 The wide variability of these values is accounted for in the regression model controlling for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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 Total asset is used as a proxy of company size 
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 See section 3.1. for definition 
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A baseline model, referred to as Model I, accounts for the direct effect of independent 
variables on the dependent
72
. In order to test HP5 the interaction effect of payment method 
on geographical distance is further introduced thus obtaining Model II. Regressions were 
run on STATA. Heteroskedasticity was tested and accounted for in order to obtain robust 
results. Below are the analytical expression of Model I and II. Testing our hypotheses 
entails estimating magnitude and sign of the  coefficients associated with each 
independent variable as well as their statistical significance. Results are reported in the next 
section. 
% Performance 3years = 0 +1 Payment+2 Type + 3 Geo +4 Diversification+5 Speed +6 Size+7 Asset + 

Equation 1. Model I: variation in Performance explained by direct effect of independent variables  
% Performance 3years = 0 +1 Payment+2 Type + 3 Geo +4 Diversification+5 Speed +6 Size+7 Asset 
+8Geo*Payment+ 
Equation 2. Model II: variation in Performance explained by direct effect of independent variables and by 
interaction effect of payment method on geographical distance 
Collinearity Test. The model respects the OLS assumption of no perfect collinearity. Indeed, 
the Correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that there is no perfect correlation among 
independent variables since the bivariate correlation coefficients are low.  
Homoskedasticity test74. Since data were found to be heteroskedastic after the Breusch-
Pagan test (see Appendix A, Table 4), the robust test was implemented in order to make up 
for heteroskedasticity and provide reliable results.   
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 I.e., to test HP 1, 2, 3, 4 
73
  is the intercept;  (=1,2…6) measure the change in Performance with respect to each independent 
variable, holding other factors fixed;  is the error term measuring unobserved factors determining the level 
of Performance.   
74
 Homoskedasticity is one of the assumptions of the OLS model. Namely, the variance of unobserved factors 
conditional on independent variables has to be constant. Heteroskedasticity test is used in STATA to check 




Regression results for Model I and II are reported in Table 5 and 6. A summary of results is 
provided in Table 7. 
R2 75. The selected independent variables all together explain 8% of the variation in 
Performance and 10% when accounting for interaction. The low values suggests that the 
selected independent variables provide low predictability of individual behavior. 
Hypothesis 1: Diversification. 4 is positive and statistically significant at 0.05 level in both 
models. Hypothesis 1, supporting that diversification is associated with positive 
performance, cannot thus be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2: Geographical proximity. Against expectations, 3 is negative in both models, 
suggesting that expansion outside Western Europe is positively correlated with 
performance. However, since results are not significant hypothesis 2 has to be rejected.  
Hypothesis 3: Deal type. 2 is positive and significant at the 0.10 level, which makes it 
reasonable to accept Hypothesis 3. Results hold for both models. 
Hypothesis 4: Method of payment. In both Model I and Model II 1 is positive and significant 
at the 0.05 confidence level, which sustains Hypothesis 4: stock or mixed deals are 
associated with higher performance.  
Hypothesis 5: Interaction effect. 8 is significant at the 0.05 confidence level, empirically 
sustaining the existence of a moderating effect of payment method on the relation between 
geographical proximity and performance. However, being 8 negative Hypothesis 5 has to 
be rejected: differently than expected, stock-financing has a negative impact on the relation 




 indicates the proportion of the sample variation in the dependent variable which is explained by the 
OLS regression line and is thus regarded as a metric for goodness-of-fit.  
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between geographical proximity and performance. For further insights about the interaction 
term see Table 1 in Appendix B.    
Acquirer size. Both models return a negative 7 significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that 
the smaller the acquirers are the higher their performance is.  
Deal size. 6 is found to be negative and not significant in both models, reporting positive 
performance associated with smaller deals.  
Speed of completion. Both models return negative 5, suggesting that the shorter the time 
elapsed between deal announcement and completion the better the performance is. Model II 
reports 0.1 significance level.   
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The original purpose of this research was to find out the deal-specific factors impacting   
long-term M&A performance in cross-border deals and the nature of such relations in the 
context of pharmaceutical and biotech companies. 
Empirical evidence sustains that diversification drives better performance, which is in 
accordance with previous findings supporting economies of scope against economies of 
scale in expanding products pipeline. This might be further motivated by wider invention 
importance and domain as well as raw materials costs cutting and stronger distribution in 
case of vertical integration. 
Asset purchase has been found to be more effective than stock deals, which might be 
explained by the advantage of acquiring IP and widening the pipeline while avoiding long 
and expensive testing of new products as well as the hurdles of integration. 
Stock deals are beneficial to performance, which might be motivated by the alignment of 
interest and prevention of misbehaviors created by tying targets to acquirers’ performance. 
18 
 
Furthermore, payment method has also a strong and significant moderating effect on 
geographical distance. Specifically, stock financing negatively moderates the relation 
between geographical proximity and performance, supporting a branch of literature 
claiming that stock-deals are more suitable when targets are located close to acquirers
76
.  
Acquirers’ size is negatively correlated with performance, which supports previous 
statements about economies of scale. Moreover, the longer the time elapsed between 
announcement and completion, the worse the deal outcome, which makes room for 
hypotheses on target resistance behaviors and their negative effects over the long-term. 
Although not supported by significance, data suggest that expansion outside Western 
Europe is associated with positive outcomes. This might support that the possibilities 
opened up by entering new markets outweigh potential costs stemming from cultural 
distance and information asymmetries. 
Results lead to conclude that it would be reasonable for pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies to leverage their knowledge through diversification and engage in IP 
acquisitions instead of controlling targets through stock purchase. Expansion in far markets 
shall be recognized as a chance to grow revenues in new markets, with method of payment 
outweighing geographical distance.   
However, research limitations call for caution and make room for further investigation.  
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 (Kang & Kim 2008) 
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7. Limitations and further research 
Sample. The sample includes only public companies headquartered in Western Europe, 
which limits the generality of results. Indeed, including private companies as well as 
international acquirers would add to the reliability of research.  
Fix effects. M&A outcomes are not necessarily the direct result of a single deal, since 
especially in the long term other corporate events might have impacted on acquirer’s 
performance. Accounting for fix effect would thus add to reliability. 
Dependent variable. Using Gross profit restricts the effects of independent variables to 
revenues and COGS. However, these are not the only metrics affected by M&A activity. 
Indeed, synergies arising from layoffs of redundant employees as well as effects on taxes 
and/or other costs components could be studied using other dependent variables, such as 
Net Income, EBIT and the like.    
Independent variables. Including other factors than those related to the deal domain would 
add predictive power to the model – e.g.,  including price dynamics following market 
concentration, would provide further insights. 
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9. Appendix A 
 
Table 1. Sample description 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Number Percentage
Speed of completion (days) 46.95 61.69 0 320
Below average 115 61.497%
Above average 72 38.503%
Method of payment:
Stock or mixed 30 16.043%
Cash 157 83.957%
Deal type:
Asset purchase 66 35.294%
Equity purchase 121 64.706%
Asset purchase - item purchased:
Property rights purchase 44 66.667%
Business unit 22 33.333%
Deal size (M US$) 399.34 1369.7 0.2 14667.6
Below average 155 82.888%
Above average 32 17.112%
Geographical proximity: 
Outside western Europe 86 45.989%
Inside Western Europe 101 54.011%
Target business:
Horizontal expansion 103 55.080%
Diversification 84 44.920%
Diversification: 
Vertical integration   40 47.619%
Other (related or unrelated diversification) 44 52.381%
Acquirer total asset (M Euro) 11128.54 19330.35 4.37 86658
Below average 142 75.936%
Above average 45 24.064%
 Gross Profit 3 years after merger completion (%) 0.84 2.44 -2.36 17.52
Below average 152 81.283%




Table 2. Description of variables used: definition, measurement, labels and source 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for Collinearity test 
 
Table 4. Heteroskedasticity test 
Definition Measurement Source Label
Independent variables
Payment method
Currency used to purchase 
stake in the target firm, either 
cash, stock or mixed payment.
Dummy: 1 if paid in 
Stock or mixed 




Dummy distinguishing asset 
purchases from equity deal
Dummy: 1 if Asset 




Dummy accounting for 
whether the cross-border deal 
is undertaken within or ouside 
Western Europe
Dummy: 1 if inside 





Dummy accounting for 
whether the deal qualifies as 
diversification or horizontal 
expansion






Number of days elapsed 
between announcement date 
and completion
Days between deal 
announcement and 
completion as reported 
in source
Bloomberg Speed
Deal size Amount paid to target firm Bloomberg Size
Acquirer size
Size of firm measured as total 
assets
Total asset reported 






Three years Gross 
Profit growth rate after 
deal completion
Difference between 
level of GP 3 years after 
and 1 year before deal 
completion, scaled by 





Speed Payment Type Size Geo Diversification Asset Performance
Speed 1
Payment 0.0006 1
Type -0.0841 -0.2619 1
Size 0.2586 -0.0156 -0.1563 1
Geo -0.095 0.1229 -0.0528 -0.0755 1
Diversification 0.0132 -0.1032 -0.0754 0.0561 -0.008 1
Asset 0.3091 -0.202 0.0553 0.1906 -0.1747 -0.0644 1
Performance -0.1178 0.1176 0.1085 -0.0688 0.0252 0.1214 -0.168 1
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of Performance
chi2(1)      =   130.18




Table 5. Regression results for Model I 
 
Table 6. Regression results for Model II 
 
Table 7. Summary of results 
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10. Appendix B 
While all information relevant for a thorough comprehension of this research is included in 
Appendix A, this appendix provides additional insights on empirical findings.  
 
Table 1. Summary of findings on interaction term 
 
 
